

TOP SECRET
SECRET

4 June 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Morning Meeting of 4 June 1969

ADD/I noted the completion and distribution of the memorandum The International Communist Conference. He also noted that [] of SRS briefed a Time magazine correspondent on this matter and that the briefing went well.

ADD/I provided the Director with a copy of the chart which has received so much publicity recently. He noted that it was prepared in DDR&E and is the chart which Senators Symington and Fulbright are said to wish would be declassified. In response to the DDCI's question, ADD/I noted that the thrust of the chart demonstrates that some fifty-odd Minutemen would survive if the Soviets went for a first strike.

[]

Carver reported that he will be seeing Dr. Kissinger at 10:30 a.m. today. The Director noted that the purpose of the meeting is to seek to settle intelligence differences on infiltration from Cambodia into Vietnam. DDCI noted he advised General Westmoreland that, compared to where we were a year ago, it appears we are closer together on our assessments.

[] mentioned that Maury was briefing Senator Baker this morning. He observed that Monday's briefing of the Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee is still on but that, due to the death of Senator Young's wife, some adjustment in scheduling may be required.

[]

TOP SECRET
SECRET

TOP SECRET
SENSITIVE

DD/P provided the Director with a memorandum outlining topics he may wish to cover with Mr. Charles Meyer, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, today.

DD/P and Carver noted the probable security leaks connected with today's New York Times articles on U. S. troop withdrawal plans in Vietnam and on the U. S. position on the Okinawa problem.



25X

The Director noted receipt of a telephone call from General Carter expressing his concern [redacted]

25X1

[redacted] ADD/I noted that this is probably the mission identified by number in a memorandum to the Director yesterday and recalled he had expressed the opinion that he would not be unhappy if it were canceled. The Director asked the EA-DCI to look into the matter.

The Director briefed on yesterday's NSC/Cabinet meeting. He noted that Secretary Rogers reported on his recent Far East trip and that Secretary Laird reported on his trip to Europe.

The Director noted that two kinds of charges are being made against the Agency which, while unfounded, cause him considerable concern; namely, that we are undercutting Secretary Laird on the ABM as evidenced by views allegedly expressed by CIA analysts in the Georgetown cocktail circuit and elsewhere and that CIA information is killing the Safeguard system. He noted that Dr. Kissinger has reported the President's concern about this matter. The Director emphasized that, to the best of our ability, we have given the best information on these matters available at the time of presentation and that the root of the problem appears to be leakage from other elements of the Government. Nevertheless, the Director made it patently clear that each Executive Committee member should brief his staff, which in turn should brief their subordinate offices on the necessity for each member of this Agency to refrain from taking a position pro or con on the ABM issue as he interfaces with non-Agency personnel in or out of the office. The Director commented that he would welcome any information which suggests that some Agency officials may have provided grist for these allegations.

The Director also noted that there are some who hold the view that the Agency is ideologically locked into various positions pertaining


TOP SECRET
SENSITIVE

TOP SECRET

SENSITIVE

to defense, i. e. , the so-called "McNamara view" pertaining to Soviet intentions and capabilities. The Director emphasized that we must examine new evidence as it appears and never become locked into any particular view. He noted that we are not always right or wrong and that it is important to scrub new evidence, tear up papers and start all over again, and not be convinced of the validity of our judgments simply because we have had occasion to brief over and over again on the same topic.

The Director noted that he will be briefing former President Johnson on 13 June and asked that steps be taken to assemble the necessary material.



L. K. White

25X

TOP SECRET

SENSITIVE

THE NEW YORK TIMES,

U.S. Says No Okinawa Decisions Have Been Made

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 3—The State Department said today that no decisions had been made by the Nixon Administration on the future status of Okinawa or American military equipment on the island and none would be taken until lengthy negotiations with the Japanese Government were completed.

But reliable informants said that President Nixon had already decided to remove American nuclear weapons from the island once a satisfactory overall plan for turning the island

back to Japanese rule has been agreed upon.

Informants said the President's decision, following a National Security Council meeting on the Okinawa issue on April 30, had been put in writing about two weeks ago as guidance for American negotiators.

Robert J. McCloskey, the State Department spokesman, was asked about a report in The New York Times this morning to this effect. In a prepared reply, he said:

"No decisions, either with respect to the removal of American nuclear weapons from Okinawa or U.S. military equipment on the island, have been made. The President has asked

the Secretary [Secretary of State William P. Rogers] to begin discussions with the Japanese Government on the matter of Okinawa.

"Until those issues have been thoroughly discussed with the Japanese—and that will take several months at least—no firm U.S. decisions will be taken."

Under questioning, Mr. McCloskey refused to elaborate on his statement.

The State Department's comments came as Secretary of State Rogers was in discussions of Okinawa and other matters with Japanese Foreign Minister Kiichi Aichi. There was

no indication whether they discussed nuclear weapons.

In talks with President Nixon yesterday, the Foreign Minister put forward Japan's demand that Okinawa and the rest of the Ryukyu island chain be returned to Japanese control by 1972 and that American bases on Okinawa be operated under the same restrictions as bases in Japan proper.

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 4, 1969

NIXON-THIEU PACT ON TROOP CUT SEEN

Continued From Page 1, Col. 1

inton's negotiating posture made by Secretary of State William P. Rogers when he visited Saigon in mid-May.

Mr. Rogers was reported to have indicated that the United States considered an interim coalition Government—as demanded by the Vietcong—special elections in Vietnam under international supervision, and amendments to the South Vietnamese Constitution as items open for negotiation in the Paris talks.

Although no one has disavowed these positions, some officials have suggested privately that Mr. Rogers may have overstepped in the interest of demonstrating American flexibility. But they also assert that Washington's acceptance of these ideas has always been clearly made contingent upon Saigon's concurrence.

Some high American officials are reported to be thinking of a mixed commission of Communist and anti-Communist elements to oversee elections in South Vietnam, but it is not clear whether Washington will put forward this plan at Midway.

The reasoning of some Americans is that this would strike a balance between the Vietcong demand for a provisional coalition to oversee the elections and Mr. Thieu's rejection of the coalition idea.

Independent diplomats have suggested that Mr. Thieu's rejection of a coalition, in public appearances in South Korea and Taiwan in the last week, was intended to quiet any private discussion of coalition schemes by United States officials.

Even before he spoke out, there was no American effort to persuade Mr. Thieu to accept a coalition. But since he has spoken out, American officials have been at pains to point this out and generally avoid discussion of the idea of coalition.

Officials also insist that President Nixon's Vietnam speech of May 14, outlining Washington's peace program, was checked out line by line with President Thieu. The South Vietnamese leader, officials say, gave the speech detailed approval after having suggested several changes in language.

The speech contained a proposal for international supervision of South Vietnamese elections, which would come "as soon as possible" after the commission is named. South Vietnamese politicians have objected to both procedures on the ground that these proposals

infringe on the South Vietnamese constitution and national sovereignty. But Washington is holding firm to both points and expects to explore them at Midway.

By Reuters

Thieu Again Bars Coalition

SAIGON, South Vietnam, June 3 (Reuters) — President Nguyen Van Thieu returned home tonight after state visits to Taiwan and South Korea and again said he rejected any coalition government with the Vietcong.

President Thieu, now preparing to meet with President Nixon Sunday on the island of Midway in the Pacific, said in a televised address today that he and the leaders of South Korea and Taiwan had agreed that a coalition with Communists should be ruled out.

Of his meeting with Mr. Nixon, the South Vietnamese leader said only, "I will report to you after I see Mr. Nixon."

Before leaving Taiwan early today, Mr. Thieu joined with Chiang Kai-shek in a communiqué calling the formation of a coalition government an "absurd demand."

The communiqué said the two men "maintain that the existing and popularly elected and legitimate Government of the Republic of Vietnam must be respected and that the absurd demand by the Communists for organization of a coalition government must be resolutely rejected."

Although officials in Saigon and Washington deny any major disagreements between Mr. Nixon and Mr. Thieu, the future role of the Vietcong appears to be a major difference between the two leaders. President Nixon has called for prompt elections in South Vietnam to include the Vietcong. Mr. Thieu appears to want to postpone any such election until the South Vietnamese presidential elections in 1971.

NIXON-THIEU TALK MAY BRING ACCORD ON U.S. TROOP CUT

**Washington Aides Prepare
for a Joint Announcement
at Meeting on Midway**

TIMING A MAJOR FACTOR

**Officials Feel Statement on
Sunday Would Demonstrate
a Unanimity of Views**

By HEDRICK SMITH
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 3 —
United States officials said today that preparations were being made for a joint announcement at Midway by President Nixon and the South Vietnamese President, Nguyen Van Thieu, of the first unilateral reductions in American forces in Vietnam.

Informants said the announcement was considered likely but that final decision to go ahead with the cutback in American forces awaited agreement by the two men at their one-day meeting on the Pacific island Sunday.

Informants said several senior officials of the Nixon Administration believe the Midway meeting would afford a proper, positive occasion for such an announcement. Their reasoning is that a joint announcement would demonstrate solidarity on the troop issue and undercut in advance any speculation that either Washington or Saigon was trying to set a timetable for troop reductions.

Thieu Gives His View

In a news conference at Taipei today, President Thieu indicated the agenda for the Midway talks would include "replacement of U.S. troops by South Vietnamese troops" paving the way for withdrawal of some of the 540,000 Americans in Vietnam.

Military and civilian sources said that the Administration was thinking of pulling out about 50,000 troops this year, starting about Sept. 1.

One possibility, Vietnam planners said, was to withdraw part of the United States Ninth Infantry Division, operating in the Mekong Delta south of Saigon, and part of one other combat division.

Differences Are Denied

Some informants cautioned that the announcement of a withdrawal might include a provision that the rate of withdrawal would be affected by the response of enemy forces. If they launched large attacks against the South Vietnamese forces that replaced American troops, officials said, Saigon and Washington could decide to suspend withdrawals.

Both South Vietnamese and American officials continue to insist there are no basic differences between the two Governments as the Midway talks approach.

But privately, some American officials concede that the Administration is backing off from some of the statements on Wash-

Continued on Page 12, Column 5

12

C

THE

Withdrawal Plans Are in Constant Re

U.S. Command Keeps All Details Secret

By JOSEPH B. TREASTER

Special to The New York Times

SAIGON, South Vietnam, June 2—High level American officers here are at work on plans for the withdrawal of United States troops from South Vietnam if President Nixon decides to give the signal.

They do not know exactly what conditions will surround a withdrawal, so several plans have been devised and they are constantly being changed.

It is expected that the question of withdrawals and the prognosis for greater South Vietnamese military capability will be among the topics discussed when President Nixon and President Nguyen Van Thieu meet on Midway Island Sunday.

The withdrawal plans are classified as secret here, but several central, overlapping themes have emerged in a series of interviews with officers and civilian officials.

According to most of those interviewed, troops are likely to leave Vietnam in "packages" or "slices" consisting of combat divisions of 15,000 men each, that is, brigades of 4,500 combat troops plus the rear elements that support them.

A division slice is figured at 50,000.

Estimate of Rate

If, as Mr. Nixon proposed in his speech May 14, "the major portion" of the United States troops is to be withdrawn parallel with a North Vietnamese withdrawal over 12 months, then the rate would have to be 40,000 a month. There are 540,000 American servicemen in Vietnam now.

If, however, as some officers suspect, the initial withdrawal will be one-sided, then the rate might be as low as 11,000 or 12,000 a month, with the level of troops stabilizing by December, 1970, at 350,000.

To many observers, it would appear politically unacceptable to have so many Americans in Vietnam 18 months from now. While the planners here are aware of the pressures on Mr. Nixon, their approach seems to lack the sense of urgency that has been voiced by some of the President's closest advisers.

Withdrawal by units would be more efficient and have greater impact on American public opinion than other possible methods, the officers and officials maintain. These men share a widespread conviction of Americans in Vietnam that while Mr. Nixon may keep a close eye on the military situation, his decision to withdraw troops will primarily be motivated by political pressure.

"The President wants to bring home a combat unit with flags flying and bands playing," one Army officer said. "He wants to make it as big as possible. He doesn't want the men to straggle home quietly."

Officers recall that the 82d Airborne Division unit would have to be covered by South Vietnamese


Rocket Cache Found Near Saigon

SAIGON, South Vietnam, June 3 (AP)—Troops of the United States 82d Airborne Division completed a two-day sweep near Saigon today and turned up a cache of 100-pound rockets.

The division reported killing 31 enemy soldiers and capturing four others in scattered fights during the sweep. Most of the action was about 11 miles northwest of the capital. However, paratroops found the rockets just five and a half miles west of Saigon yesterday.

Earlier that day, two rockets were fired into Saigon, the first since May 17, killing three South Vietnamese civilians and wounding 17.

The cache of 122-mm. rockets—which have a maximum range of seven miles—was found in a bunker. The exact number of rockets was not known. The paratroops saw that the bunker contained at least one rocket and, fearing booby traps, blew it up with an explosive charge. "There must have been a lot more rockets down there," a military spokesman said. "The whole



The New York Times June 4, 1969

area just seemed to erupt. It left about a 20-foot crater."

Military sources said United States losses were one killed and 15 wounded during the sweep.

Elsewhere Tuesday, elements of the United States 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment killed 12 enemy soldiers and captured four in a brief fight 55 miles northwest of Saigon near Anloc. Three Americans were wounded in the 40-minute exchange.

Vietnam in less than a week, and many fully expect Mr. Nixon to withdraw the first combat unit in a similar dramatic fashion.

The subsequent units, however, are expected to leave more slowly—perhaps a few hundred men a day or whatever number is required under the rate of withdrawal specified by Mr. Nixon.

South Vietnamese Improve

While there have been more than 500,000 Americans in Vietnam for more than 14 months, the officers have seen reports that the South Vietnamese Army is improving somewhat and indications that the effectiveness of the enemy is diminishing. They have also watched American infantrymen unrelentingly searching for the enemy with less and less success.

Against this backdrop, many officers believe that, as one plan suggests, up to 200,000 Americans might be withdrawn without military risk.

The officers still feel uneasy talking about withdrawal and they stress that the situation "could change overnight."

"Then it would be a whole different ball game," one officer said. "It depends on what the enemy wants to put into the war."

As far as can be determined, no American units have received orders to begin planning a move to the United States.

Whether Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, the commander of American troops here, believes that his command could spare 200,000 men is not known. His spokesmen refuse to discuss any phase of withdrawal.

It is generally agreed that, without a significant change in the number of enemy troops or their position, the void created by the withdrawal of American troops would have to be covered either by South Vietnamese

First Unit Expected to Go With Fanfare

The 173d, as well as the other independent brigades and regiments are also considered likely because they are combat units and at the same time are compact and more easy to transport than a division.

The two airmobile divisions—the First Cavalry Division and the 101st—are expected to be among the last to leave because of their flexibility. Each division has 450 helicopters and could conceivably patrol the territory usually assigned to three or four regular divisions.

The defenders of Saigon, Army engineers and helicopter, artillery and transportation units, with their drivers and loading personnel, and units not expected to be active in peacetime will also be in the rear of the homeward procession. The Ninth and the Americal Divisions were activated for the Vietnam war, as were the 199th Light Infantry Brigade and the 11th Armored Cavalry regiment.

Heavy equipment such as tanks, bulldozers, helicopters, howitzers, trucks, buses and jeeps will leave on cargo ships.

Navy Turns Over Craft

No doubt the South Vietnamese would like to have much of the equipment but, according to some of the most knowledgeable American officers, the United States cannot spare it.

"We've robbed our units at home of equipment to keep down the cost of the war," said an Army colonel. "Almost all of the gear with combat divisions will go back with the unit because it takes too long to re-equip. If we leave stuff here it will be beyond fair wear-and-tear or because of political considerations."

The exception will be the Navy, which has already begun a program to turn over to South Vietnamese Government sailors some 400 of the small craft that it operates in South Vietnam.

In the months ahead, the South Vietnamese are also scheduled to receive more than 300 new helicopters and at least 40 more jet fighter-bombers. Several score of howitzers will also go to the South Vietnamese, but the quantity has not been made public.

As the American presence dwindles, the corps commands will be dissolved, possibly to be replaced by a time by division commanders. In the final days the headquarters of General Abrams will be closed.

Air Force bases are expected to be eliminated in proportion to the Army reduction. Gradually ships in the Seventh Fleet will be shifted from the Vietnam coast to other stations in the western Pacific.